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Talking Foreign Policy:
Responding to Rogue States
“Talking Foreign Policy” is a one-hour radio program,
hosted by the Dean of Case Western Reserve University School
of Law, Michael Scharf, in which experts discuss the important
foreign policy issues. The premier broadcast (airdate: March 1,
2012) covered the controversial use of predator drones,
humanitarian intervention in Syria, and responding to Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Subsequent broadcasts have
covered topics such as the challenges of bringing indicted tyrants
to justice, America’s Afghanistan exit strategy, the issue of
presidential power in a war without end, and President Obama’s
second term foreign policy team. This broadcast focused on the
responding to rogue states. ………………………………………………………………
The purpose of the radio show is to cover some of the most
salient foreign policy topics and discuss them in a way that can
make it easier for listeners to grasp. “Talking Foreign Policy” is
recorded in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream studio, Cleveland’s
NPR affiliate. Michael Scharf is joined each session with a few
expert colleagues known for their ability to discuss complex
topics in an easy-to-digest manner:
• The ambassador: Todd F. Buchwald, former Ambassador for
Global Criminal Justice and Assistant Legal Adviser for U.N.
Affairs, and current fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars;
• The prosecutor: James Johnson, former Chief of Prosecutions
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone and current the Director of
the War Crimes Research Office at Case Western Reserve
University;
• The international law guru: Milena Sterio, Associate Dean of
The Cleveland Marshall College of Law; and
• The negotiator: Paul R. Williams, president of the Public
International Law and Policy Group.
Archived broadcasts (both in audio and video format) of
“Talking
Foreign
Policy”
are
available
at:
https://law.case.edu/TalkingForeignPolicy. The transcript of
the September 17, 2018 broadcast appears below.
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Talking Foreign Policy: Responding to Rogue States
September 17, 2018 broadcast 1
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy, I’m your host,
Michael Scharf, 2 Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. In this broadcast, our expert panelists will be discussing the
issue of responding to Rogue States. For our program today, we’ve
assembled a panel of experts on peace negotiations, national security,
human rights and war crimes. Joining Talking Foreign Policy for the
first time is Todd Buchwald, who served as the State Department’s
Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice and Assistant Legal Adviser
for U.N. Affairs, and he is currently a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. 3 I’ve known the ambassador since
we worked together at the State Department twenty-five years ago, so
I will dispense with the formalities and just say: Welcome to our
show, Todd.
TODD BUCHWALD: Great to be here.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And we are also joined by another new guest,
James Johnson, 4 who served as Chief of Prosecutions of the Special
Court of Sierra Leone after a two-decade career in the U.S. JAG
Corps. He is currently the director of the War Crimes Research Office
at Case Western Reserve University. Welcome Jim.
JAMES JOHNSON: Thank you, Michael.

1.

Transcript edited and footnotes added by Cox Center Fellows Nicole
Divittorio, George Kamanda, Alexandria McKenna, and Alex Lilly.

2.

Michael Scharf, CASE WESTERN RESERVE SCHOOL OF LAW (2019),
available at https://law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-OurFaculty/Faculty-Detail/id/142. Michael Scharf is the Dean of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. He has also written and
published extensively in the area of international law.

3.

Todd F. Buchwald, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2019), available at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/251248.htm.
Prior
to
becoming a career lawyer in the Department’s Office of the Legal
Advisor, Ambassador Buchwald served in the Office of White House
Counsel and as an associate at Washington law firm Wilmer, Cutler,
and Pickering.

4.

Jim Johnson, CASE WESTERN RESERVE SCHOOL OF LAW (2019), available
at https://law.case.edu/Our-School/Faculty-Staff/Adjunct-Faculty. Jim
Johnson served as Chief of Prosecutions of the Special Court of Sierra
Leone after a two-decade career in the Jag Corps. He is currently the
Director of the War Crimes Research Office at Case Western Reserve
University.
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MICHAEL SCHARF: And we
back with us today. First,
Public International Law
nominated NGO that has
negotiations over the past
show, Paul.

have two Talking Foreign Policy regulars
Dr. Paul Williams, 5 the president of the
& Policy Group, a Nobel-Peace-Prize
provided legal counsel in a dozen peace
twenty-two years. Welcome back to the

PAUL WILLIAMS: Michael, it’s great to be back.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And also with us in the WCPN 90.3 Ideastream
Studio is Professor Milena Sterio, 6 who is the associate dean of
Cleveland Marshall College of Law and a renowned international law
expert. It’s good to have you back on the program, Milena.
MILENA STEREO: It is great to be here, Michael.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let me kick things off by asking Ambassador
Todd Buchwald—how would you define what is a Rogue State?
TODD BUCHWALD: Well, it’s very interesting. It’s not really a legal
term and it doesn’t really have a fixed meaning. 7 For the most part,
it’s been used as a way to talk about States that don’t abide by
norms on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism. 8 That’s the way it was used early on by the Clinton
5.

Paul Williams, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW
(2019),
available
at
https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/pwilliams/bi
o. Paul Williams is a professor at American University Washington
College of Law. He is also the president of the Public International Law
& Policy Group, a Nobel-Peace-Prize-nominated NGO that has provided
legal counsel in a dozen of peace negotiations over the past twenty-two
years.

6.

Milena Sterio, CLEVELAND MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW (2019), available
at
https://www.law.csuohio.edu/newsevents/featuredfaculty/milenasterio. Milena Sterio is the Associate Dean of Cleveland Marshall
College of Law and a renowned international law expert.

7.

The definition of “Rogue States” is not fixed. It once referred to States
that had “failed to adhere to the rule of law.” Now, “it has become an
elastic catchphrase that is used to demonize behavior and rally political
support.” Robert S. Litwak, A LOOK AT…Rogue States, WASH. POST
(Feb.
20,
2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/02/20/a-lookat-rogue-states/62a19e42-433d-4915-9bbc97c5b900603e/?utm_term=.09419533d376.

8.

Post-Cold War Policy – Isolating and Punishing “Rogue States”,
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(2019),
AMERICAN
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Post-cold-War-PolicyIsolating-and-punishing-rogue-states.html.
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administration; though, at some point, the Clinton administration
made a concerted effort to stop using the word because they thought
it was interfering with their ability to conduct diplomacy with
countries on the list, like North Korea, who they engaged with. 9 In
the Bush administration, it came to be used in association with the
famous Axis of Evil countries. Again, it was about terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. 10 There was sort of a background noise
to the whole thing—that you might be a target for regime change at
some point—in the air. That was in the Bush administration. In the
Trump administration, President Trump has used the term when he
spoke to the U.N. General Assembly last year, and he added
Venezuela to the list. 11 And that was interesting because it’s a
different kind of Rouge State. I mean, one can easily see that it’s not
a very comfortable State to deal with. But it was different in the
sense that unlike most of the [Rogue] States, its rogueness was
directed internally rather than externally. So, that’s the way it’s used.
I think, by and large, the term is still about externally-directed
threats. 12
MICHAEL SCHARF: I think you have coined a new phrase that we may
be using today, rougeness. So, based on the rogueness criteria, let me
ask our expert panel: Which countries in the world do you all consider
to be Rogue States? 13 Todd, let’s start with you. What would be on
your list?
TODD BUCHWALD: I still tend to think of the States as the security
threats. The security rogues. Maybe because of my background as an
international lawyer, those are the States that tend to have the more
immediate…
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, the worst ones on your list would be?

9.

Litwak, supra note 7.

10.

Massimo Calabresi, The Axis of Evil Is It For Real?, TIME (Feb. 3,
2002),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,198894,00.html.

11.

Remarks by President Donald Trump to the 72nd Session of the United
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 19, 2017), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/.

12.

Litwak, supra note 7.

13.

Robert Rotberg, The Threat from Rogue States, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov.
6, 2004), available at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/threatrogue-states.
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TODD BUCHWALD: Well, the worst ones on the executive branch’s list
would still be Iran…you would have thought North Korea; there’s sort
of a strange relationship now with North Korea. But, those two are
probably at the top of the list.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, what would you add?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Oh, I would definitely keep North Korea on the list,
and then I would add the triumvirate of Syria, Sudan, and Burma, or
Myanmar, as they like to be called. All highly destabilizing both
internally and externally. 14
MICHAEL SCHARF: And Milena, what would you put on the list?
MILENA STERIO: For some historical perspective, you might go back
to, for example, Libya under Gaddafi 15—certainly at the end of that
regime. And I certainly agree with both Paul and Todd regarding
their lists. You might go back and say Serbia or the F.R.Y.—Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia—under Milosevic, as well. 16
MICHAEL SCHARF: But not currently in either of those cases?
MILENA STERIO: Not currently.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay, and Jim: Is there anything we are leaving
off?
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, I think that I might add—I don’t think Paul
mentioned it—Yemen. I think I might add Yemen to that list.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay. So, what about Cuba? Would any of you
put Cuba on that list? Todd?
TODD BUCHWALD: It is a funny kind of list to be put on because you
don’t know what it is that happens when you’re on it. I think the
relationship with Cuba, probably at this point, has a highly political
14.

Id.

15.

David E. Sanger and Judith Miller, Libya To Give Up Arms Programs,
TIMES
(Dec.
20,
2003),
Bush
Announces,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/world/libya-to-give-up-armsprograms-bush-announces.html.

16.

See Michael P. Scharf, The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, 4 ASIL
INSIGHTS
3
(June
5,
1999),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/4/issue/3/indictment-slobodanmilosevic.
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dimension to it—but I think it really is a little bit different than the
other States on the list. 17
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about Turkey? Things are getting pretty out
of control in our relations with Turkey. 18 Would you put them on the
list, anybody?
MILENA STERIO: I wouldn’t. When I think of Rogue States, I also
think of States that are willing to, essentially, flagrantly act roguely.
That might be a new word, too.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, like, invading another country, sending
internet attacks into other countries…
MILENA STERIO: Invading another country, using chemical weapons,
and things of that sort.
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about Russia?
MILENA STERIO: Well, Russia actually is very good at using
international law rhetoric to justify its actions. Russia doesn’t stand
up and say, “Oh we don’t care about international law.”
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, is a Rogue State only one that says, “We don’t
care about the rules?”
MILENA STERIO: Well, the other difference I think is if we are
defining rogueness, are we talking about it from the United States
perspective, or are we talking about it from some objective, global
perspective?
MICHAEL SCHARF: What’s the difference?
MILENA STERIO: Well, there is a difference. There are States that are
clearly threats, perhaps, to the U.S. And when we talk about, for
example, Turkey, you might say, “Okay, U.S.-Turkey relations are
really at a low point right now. But from a global perspective, I don’t
think Turkey is on the same level as Syria, for example, or some of
these other States.”
17.

Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Jan.
19,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations.

18.

Colin Dwyer and Larry Kaplow, What’s the Deal with The Deepening
Dispute Between U.S. And Turkey? NPR (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/13/638162581/whats-the-deal-with-thedeepening-dispute-between-u-s-and-turkey.
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay. So, focusing on those states that are threats
to the United States that you’ve listed. Paul Williams: Why should
the US care particularly about these countries?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, I think, Michael, there are two reasons why
the United States should care about Rogue States. The first is that
they directly impact our security. The United States has security
interests woven throughout the globe, and when you have States—
either by the strict definition of rejecting the norms relating to
terrorism, or as the broader definition of rogueness that we seem to be
establishing here—this impacts our ability to maintain the security of
the United States and our allies. 19 So, for instance, with North Korea
and its nuclear weapons, you know it has the ability to annihilate
South Korea and Japan and possibly the ability to strike the United
States. Syria pushing millions of refugees into Lebanon, Jordon,
Turkey and into Europe—it’s highly destabilizing. 20 Turkey might
not be rogue, but is certainly on the verge of being destabilized, and
there are security consequences. 21 So, the States acting outside the
bounds of the normative structure that the Americans have worked
for over the decades to create substantially impacts our interests.
Second, I think it’s important to add that if they impact their own
populations as well, that’s also something Americans used to—and
should continue to—care about. Burma has pushed out 700,000 of
their own civilians into Bangladesh. And some would call this—what
they’ve been doing—genocide. 22 This is something that may not
impact our security interests, but we should care about it.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay, so with most of the countries we have been
talking about, it’s the government itself that is acting roguish. What
about those countries where there are terrorists, or rebels, or pirates
that are operating freely because they are failed states? Milena, do
19.

Mara Karlin, After 7 Years of War, Assad has Won in Syria: What’s
Next for Washington?, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/13/after-7years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-washington/.

20.

Kemal Kirişci, Jessica Brandt, and M. Murat Erdoğan, Syrian Refugees
in Turkey: Beyond the Numbers, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 19,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/06/19/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-beyond-the-numbers/.

21.

Sebnem Koser Akcapar, Turkey Stands Between Europe and the Next
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2018),
Refuge
Crisis,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/opinion/syria-idlib-refugeesturkey-war-erdogan-putin-assad.html.

22.

Myanmar Rohingya: What you Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561.
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you think there is a difference between a Rogue State and a failed
State?
MILENA STERIO: Sure. I think definitely there is a difference, as you
correctly stated. Most of these Rogue States that we just mentioned
are ruled by governments that have effective control over the territory
of those States. A few years ago, maybe Syria was in a different
category, but right now President Assad has control over most of the
Syrian territory. 23 Other presidents of the States that we have
mentioned have control over their territory. A failed State, to the
contrary, is a State where the government no longer exercises effective
control over their territory, which then allows groups like non-State
actors, terrorists, pirates, rebels, and narco-traffickers to operate with
impunity. 24 And the classical example of a failed State would be
Somalia, where— about ten years ago—pirates were basically free to
roam because there was no effective government oversight. 25
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, whether we are talking about a failed State or
a Rogue State, let me ask the ambassador: When is it better for the
U.S. to act in concert with others through the U.N. or NATO, and
when do you feel it’s necessary for the United States to consider
acting on its own?
TODD BUCHWALD: Well, I think in principle, it’s always better to act
with others and in as large a coalition as possible. If you have this
picture of a Rogue State as a State that is playing out of the accepted
lines, if you’re in concert with others, it’s clear you’re able to more
clearly demonstrate where those lines are. So, if we’re the only one
saying, “You’re playing outside the lines,” it doesn’t resonate nearly
as much as if the entire international community makes that claim.
Now, when you talk about the international community, it’s a
concept; you can’t touch the international community. You could be
talking about the U.N. General Assembly or the U.N. Security
Council; if it’s a situation in Europe, you could be talking about
NATO. 26 There are times, however, when it won’t be possible to act
multilaterally, and I think the United States will always reserve to
23.

Karlin, supra note 19.

24.

Failed States, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (last visited Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/failed-states.html.

25.

Hassan Barise, Somalia – Where Pirates Roam Free, BBC (Nov. 11,
2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4424264.stm.

26.

Ian Black, NATO Alerted to Dangers of Rogue States, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/27/afghanistan.terrorism
20.
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itself at least the prospect of acting unilaterally, if for no other reason
than you have to reserve that prospect as part of the campaign of
building a multilateral coalition.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And I think you’re mostly talking about use of
economic sanctions and use of force. Let me turn to Jim Johnson. As
an international prosecutor, when should prosecution of leaders of
Rogue States be considered and pursued?
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, first, Michael, let me just state that your
question assumes that there might be an international tribunal or
some judicial body that is capable of carrying out a prosecution.
Unfortunately, in many instances—you look around the world
today—with leaders this may not be the case. But there is clearly the
precedent developed by Nuremberg and reinforced by the modern
tribunals that makes it clear: war crimes and crimes against humanity
are committed by individuals. And as a head of State, you are
responsible; and, as a head of State, you have no immunity from
international crimes. So, indeed, you can be prosecuted. And when
you’re looking at when you should be prosecuted, I’m a prosecutor
and that’s first and foremost in my mind. I believe that when there
are reasonable grounds to believe that a leader has committed a war
crime or crime against humanity, that action should be taken towards
the prosecution of that leader. Beyond that, you also are going to
want to look at the gravity of the crimes that have been committed.
Also relevant is the location of the victims? Are they internal or
external? These are some of the kinds of things that you look at, I
think, when you are prosecuting a leader.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, we are almost out of time for our first
segment. When we return, we will focus our discussion on the case
study of Syria, the greatest humanitarian crisis facing the world in the
last decade. 27 We’ll be back in just a moment.
---- [Station break] ----

MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy brought
to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3
Ideastream. I’m Michael Scharf, the Dean of the Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. I’m joined today by the former
U.S. Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice, Todd Buckwald; the
international prosecutor who convicted Liberian president Charles
Taylor for war crimes, Jim Johnson; famed peace negotiator, Dr. Paul
27.

Syria: The Biggest Humanitarian Crisis of Our Time, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 1, 2018) https://www.amnesty.org.nz/takeaction/syria-crisis.
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Williams of the Public International Law & Policy group; and an
international law guru, Associate Dean Milena Stereo of Cleveland
Marshall College of Law. We are talking today about the challenges of
responding to Rogue States. In this segment of our show, I’d like to
focus the group’s attention on the crisis in Syria. Since the beginning
of the civil war there in 2011, the Assad regime has killed and
displaced millions of people, and on several occasions the regime has
used chemical weapons in opposition-controlled areas. Syria has
become the greatest humanitarian crisis of our time. 28 Let me begin
by asking ambassador Todd Buckwald: Why hasn’t the U.N. Security
Council been able to take action to respond to the growing crisis in
Syria?
TODD BUCHWALD: Under the U.N. Charter, if the Security Council
takes a decision, all U.N. member states—basically every country in
the world—is under a legal obligation to accept and carry out the
decision. 29 That’s Article 25 of the U.N. Charter. 30 The U.N. Security
Council has five permanent members: the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. And, the way the Charter is
structured, a decision can only be taken if all five of the permanent
members concur in that decision. 31 And, of course, in the last several
years Russia—acting as protector of the Syrian client state—has
vetoed a number of resolutions, including a resolution to refer the
situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court and a variety of
other resolutions related to Syria that were favored by us and many
other countries. 32
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, what is it about Syria that Russia likes so
much? They do have a port in Tartus; is that important to them? 33
28.

Eyder Peralta, UN: Syrian Crisis Is ‘Biggest Humanitarian Emergency
of
Our
Era,
NPR
(Aug.
29,
2014),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/08/29/344219323/u-nsyrian-refugee-crisis-is-biggest-humanitarian-emergency-of-our-era.

29.

What is the Security Council?, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).

30.

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs Supplement,
Supplement
No.
10
(2000-2009),
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../repertory/art25/english/rep_supp10
_vol3_art25.pdf&lang=E.

31.

United Nations Security Council Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/united-nations-securitycouncil-fast-facts/index.html.

32.

Syria: Does Russia Always Use a Veto at the UN Security Council?,
BBC (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43781954.

33.

Frank Gardner, How Vital is Syria’s Tartus Port to Russia?, BBC (Jun.
27, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18616191.
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TODD BUCHWALD: Yes that’s important to them. What’s also
important to them is their influence in the area, and I think it’s
partly a way to demonstrate that they have to be met on their terms.
There have been lots of proposals to get around—lots of ideas for
getting around—the Russian veto. 34 There are ideas to amend the
Charter of the United Nations to take away or limit the use of the
veto. The political reality is that I don’t think there’s a way around
it. The Security Council veto is hard-baked into the Charter. I think
in the reality of that, leaders—more and more—will come to other
ways of organizing international efforts. In Syria it’s hard to do
anything effective because the Syrians, basically, are winning the war,
and that’s the reality that lawyers and policymakers in Washington
are having a hard time dealing with. 35
MICHAEL SCHARF: But the U.S. has taken matters into its own hands:
on April 6th, 2017, the U.S. fired 56 cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase
after Syria deployed sarin gas in the town of Kahn Shaykhun near
Damascus. 36 And then, on April 14th, 2018, the U.K., the U.S., and
France together fired a hundred and five cruise missiles at Syrian
chemical weapons production and storage facilities after the Syrian
government deployed chlorine gas in the Damascus suburb of Duma. 37
Milena, do most governments and legal experts believe that these air
strikes were lawful under international law given the Security
Council’s paralysis because of Russia’s veto?
MILENA STERIO: I think that most governments and legal experts, as
of now, do not believe that these airstrikes were lawful under
international law because international law has a very basic norm
which is a prohibition on States to use force against other States. The
only two well-accepted, well recognized exceptions to that ban are
situations where there is Security Council approval for the use of force

34.

Louis Charbonneau, Dozens of Nations Back French Appeal to Limit
(Sept.
30,
2015),
Use
of
U.N.
Veto,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-vetoidUSKCN0RU30V20150930.

35.

Why Assad is Winning the War in Syria, PBS (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-assad-is-winning-the-war-insyria.

36.

Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, Dozens of
U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-toweigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html.

37.

Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack ‘Chemical Weapons Site’, BBC
(Apr.
14,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east43762251.
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and self-defense. 38 And, as Todd just told us regarding Syria, there is
no Security Council authorization, nor will there be one in the near
future, because of the Russian and, perhaps, Chinese veto. 39 So the
Security Council is a no-go in this situation. And it’s very hard for
the U.S., the U.K., and France to argue that they acted in self-defense
because Assad was using the chemical weapons only against Syrian
citizens, in areas where there were no U.S., U.K., or French forces
nearby. One argument that some scholars, and I know you, Michael,
are starting to talk and write about this, is this idea that
humanitarian intervention is another exception to this ban on the use
of force. 40 And so, unless we’re willing to accept this idea of
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization as
an exception to the use of force, it is hard to legally justify the
airstrikes.
MICHAEL SCHARF: People have been talking about this for almost
twenty years. Paul, for example, you participated in the negotiations
at Rambouillet to try to avert the Kosovo conflict. And after the 1999
NATO airstrikes against Serbia to halt the ethnic cleansing of the
Kosovo Albanians, the U.N. did endorse something called the
“responsibility to protect,” or R2P doctrine. 41 Does that doctrine
permit unilateral humanitarian use of force like the airstrikes on
Syria?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well Michael, my sense is that we’re very close to
having international acceptance of a legal doctrine which permits the
unilateral use of force. As Todd has pointed out, Security Council
authorization is hard-baked into the U.N Charter, but it’s being
rampantly abused by the Russians to provide cover for states like
Syria who are committing mass atrocities against their civilians—you
know, four, maybe 500,000 killed by the regime. 42 Milena properly
38.

U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter, art. 51.

39.
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pointed out that the doctrine was created to allow for States to
intervene when a country was unable or unwilling to protect its
population, or where it was actually, in fact, carrying out those
atrocities.13 The early versions of R2P require Security Council
authorization. But, I think we’ve seen in Kosovo there was a
humanitarian intervention by NATO with no Security Council
authorization. 43 We’ve now had two interventions: first, by the
Americans, and then by the Americans along with the French and the
British in Syria, where there was no Security Council authorization. 44
I think the flagrant violation of its responsibilities by Russia at the
U.N., coupled with this increasing trend of countries massacring their
own civilians, is definitely tipping the scales in the direction of some
type of souped-up responsibility to protect which will no longer
require authorization by the Security Council. And quite frankly,
Mike, that day cannot come soon enough.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, about 70 countries around the world chimed in
with support of the U.S./U.K./French air strikes on Syria last April.
The only countries that were against it, quite frankly, were Russia
and Syria, and then China joined in. 45 Do this overwhelming support
and other factors indicate that something is changing, as Milena
pointed out? Let’s unpeel the onion and see how this new case might
be different than other cases. So, first of all, let me ask the panelists
at large: Does it matter that this case was about chemical weapons
use and the targets were chemical weapons facilities, as opposed to—
in the other cases—other types of crimes against humanity where the
targets were broad military and governmental targets? In the Serbia
case, they just bombed anything that was a military target, right? 46
So, does that make a difference, Todd?
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TODD BUCHWALD: I think, whether rightly or wrongly, with the way
international law works it does make a difference. I think clearly
something’s changing, and peoples’ willingness to accept this kind of
thing is way higher, and goes up more and more, because of all the
atrocious behavior we see in Syria. Whether a new legal rule emerges
is not necessarily the same question. When you look at the way the
president talked about what he had authorized, he didn’t really talk
about it in terms of humanitarian intervention concepts. He talked
about it in terms, like you’re talking about, of the special threat that
weapons of mass destruction pose to U.S. security. 47 He’s dealing with
it in a situation where U.S. troops are already in the theatre. And it
seems to me that, in a not completely elegant way he’s groping for a
self-defense kind of explanation for what he’s doing. But what’s
interesting is that he’s justifying what he’s doing by an appeal to a
humanitarian doctrine. But some scholars have opined that if the real
rationale were humanitarian intervention, there were probably ways
to save more lives than bombing those chemical facilities. If the idea
is to get your most humanitarian bang for the buck, this wasn’t it.
There’s a different explanation for why this happened. That’s at least
one way to look at it.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Milena?
MILENA STERIO: The other thing that I would mention that’s really
important regarding this particular intervention in April of 2018 is the
rhetoric used by the States—particularly the U.K. The U.K.
government specifically talked about humanitarian intervention and
how this was legal under that doctrine. 48 When you go back to the
Kosovo case, the State Department was very explicit that Kosovo was
sui generis; it wasn’t supposed to create any kind of a precedent.
They said “these were unique circumstances. We’re not arguing that
humanitarian intervention is actually legal.” In the Kosovo case,
others talked about how that intervention was legitimate but not
legal, and there was moral authority for it even if there wasn’t legal
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authority. 49 Now, the U.K. government is saying: “this is
humanitarian intervention, this is legal.” And the U.S. government is
basically making statements like, “we’re in complete agreement with
the U.K.” 50
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let me ask you, so Nikki Haley, the ambassador to
the United Nations from the United States, said that at the Security
Council. There is a doctrine in international law that if a country
adopts another country’s position or other group’s positions—if they
ratify it—they can be held to be responsible for it. Isn’t this kind of
language that Nikki Haley used, when she said “we are in lockstep
and in complete agreement with the U.K.” isn’t that close to a case of
adoption under that doctrine? 51 The adoption doctrine was once used
in the International Court of Justice in the case of Iran’s adoption of
the student protestors’ attack and takeover of the U.S. embassy. The
International Court of Justice said the government of Iran is now
responsible because they applauded that action, and because they said
that they agreed with it. How is this any different? 52 Todd?
TODD BUCHWALD: I think Nikki Haley’s words reflected a sort of
purposeful ambiguity. “We’re in lockstep with them” is another way
of just saying we were supportive of our allies. If you go back to the
1999 NATO intervention in Serbia, that is when the United Kingdom
first said that humanitarian intervention was lawful. 53 The U.K. used
the doctrine again to justify the imposition of no-fly zones to protect
Kurds and Shi’ites in Iraq. They had their theory, which was a
humanitarian intervention theory. And the U.S. had its our own
theory, which was not based on humanitarian intervention. To me,
what I see going on is a long history of the United States coming up
49.
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with a different rationale, other than humanitarian intervention, to
justify its actions. For it to be real customary international law, state
officials are going to have to stand up and say, clearly, “this is what
we think.”
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul, what do you think?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Michael, I think the Brits have this right. The Brits
realize that in today’s world, you’re going to need to engage in
humanitarian intervention in cases like Kosovo and cases in Syria for
your own national security and also just to protect, quite frankly,
humanity. The Americans, for decades, have been dodging this
question. The silliness of, “it’s illegal but it’s legitimate” and any
possible rationale we could come up with. Quite frankly, it’s time for
the U.S. government—and I think the Trump administration to a
degree, has—to embrace that doctrine.22 The U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinion on the Syria airstrikes talked
about the relationship between the humanitarian catastrophe from
use of chemical weapons against civilians and U.S. security interests,
so the United States is inching towards humanitarian intervention.
But it’s time for the Americans to be serious; we are doing
humanitarian intervention. Let’s create a legal framework, like the
British have, for those interventions. Let’s do it in a limited
circumstance, with limited scope, with as little force as possible, but
let’s create a legal framework around it. Let’s not have it run free
range around the globe because that’s when the Russians, the
Chinese, and others will take advantage of a wobbly legal doctrine.
MICHAEL SCHARF: I will note that Harold Koh, who was the former
legal advisor at the State Department, has chastised both the
Democratic and Republican administrations of the United States for
not being specific when they do humanitarian intervention and doing,
instead, what Todd was describing 54—having these factors, and saying
it’s sui generis, which means there’s no precedent, just “this is an
exceptional case.” Koh said the risk of the U.S. approach is that
other countries will abuse the precedent because the U.S. is creating a
very amorphous precedent. It’s not that they’re creating no precedent,
which is what—I think—the U.S. hopes is happening. Instead, they
are creating a precedent, but it’s one where they are letting the genie
54.
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out of the bottle and people can interpret it in all different ways. I
think that’s what you’re getting at. Is that right, Paul?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yes, the Russians have used a version of this
humanitarian intervention for their intervention in South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, and Crimea, Eastern Ukraine. None of those are
humanitarian interventions that would be justified by the U.K.
rationale. 55
MICHAEL SCHARF: But the answer is not to say, then, that there
shouldn’t be any humanitarian interventions, but to cabin it off with
some very precise rules.
PAUL WILLIAMS: Right.
MILENA STERIO: Well Michael, Russia is citing the Kosovo
precedent, 56 although the State Department is saying it’s not a
precedent. 57
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Harold Koh’s point.
MILENA STERIO: Exactly. And Harold Koh said that we, as lawyers,
shouldn’t be—I think he called us “potted plants.” 58 That it is our
duty to get out there.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Get out there first and articulate clear doctrine.
MILENA STERIO: Exactly.
PAUL WILLIAMS: We’re creating precedent, let’s stop pretending we’re
not creating precedent.
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, one of the lawyers in the studio is an
international prosecutor. Let me bring Jim Johnson back into the
conversation. Jim, what is being done to pave the way for war crimes
55.
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trials of President Assad and others in Syria that are using chemical
weapons, that are using barrel bombs, that are torturing people—and
seem to be getting away with it? 59
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, Michael, as we mentioned a few minutes ago,
one of the concerns right now is that for many of these leaders of
rogue regimes, there is no option to prosecute them—as in the case of
Syria. 60
MICHAEL SCHARF: What about the European countries which have
launched prosecutions of Syrians based on universal jurisdiction in
their national courts? 61 Is that working?
JAMES JOHNSON: There have been some cases brought against lower
figures but they have not pursued a case against President Assad as
he is protected by Head of State immunity. And when you look from
an international perspective, there does not seem to be an option to
prosecute him. 62 Attempts to either create an ad hoc tribunal, or to
refer this case to the International Criminal Court, have been vetoed
by Russia and others in the Security Council. But that doesn’t mean
that steps are not being taken. The most critical element of cases of
war crimes and crimes against humanity is to get in and to collect
and preserve the evidence.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And that’s being done?
JAMES JOHNSON: That is being done, and initiatives are taking place
to help that process along. First, really, since the start of the war in
Syria, several NGO’s have been attempting to collect and gather
evidence in Syria and, most importantly, to preserve that evidence.
And, now, the United Nations has taken steps. The General Assembly
has established the International Independent and Impartial
Mechanism, which has been created to collect, collate, and preserve
evidence of war crimes in Syria—so that eventually, if there is a
59.
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prosecution that can indeed take place, it will. 63 You look at the
killing fields of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, for example: it was
thirty years after they fell from power that Cambodia finally created
a tribunal that could try the genocide in Cambodia. 64
MICHAEL SCHARF: Meanwhile, if countries are getting impatient
about prosecutions, I do note that Pulitzer prize winning journalist
Bob Woodward’s new book said that the White House had
considered, seriously, the assassination of President Assad. 65 Let me
turn to Paul: What’s your take on that? What are the pros and cons
of using assassination as a policy tool against rogue leaders?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Wow, that’d be the ultimate humanitarian
intervention. It’s highly dangerous, it’s highly unpredictable, and it’s
highly destabilizing. I think this would be a return to the bad old
days of targeting individual leaders, which is something—although
we’re quite extensively engaged in targeting terrorist leaders—we’ve
very much moved away from the days of targeting heads of State. To
do so without a plan for State building, or without a plan for an
alternative government, could be very dangerous and very
destabilizing, and wouldn’t accomplish the objective of stopping the
atrocities on the ground.
MICHAEL SCHARF: And I suppose it could turn the globe into a
version of the Old West, where countries are just trying to assassinate
each other’s leaders left and right?
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yes.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Right, now there is a taboo against that.
PAUL WILLIAMS: There is a taboo, and that taboo supports our
strategic interests.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, well, it’s time for another short break.
When we return, we’ll talk about some of the other rogue regime
flashpoints around the world. Back in a moment.
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MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Michael Scharf and we’re back with
Talking Foreign Policy. I’m joined today by some of the world’s
foremost experts on dealing with rogue nations. In this final segment
of our broadcast, I want to ask our experts to discuss some of the
other States that the Trump administration has labeled as rogue
regimes, starting with Iran. 66 Paul Williams: Tell us why Iran should
be on our radar as a rogue State.
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well, Mike, if we were to employ Todd’s rogueness
scale, we’d find that the Iranians are at the top of the scale. When
the Iranians aren’t busy attempting to build a nuclear weapons or
ballistic missile delivery systems for those nuclear weapons, they’re
overseeing tens of thousands of elite Iranian troops operating in Syria,
fighting against the Syrian opposition, and committing atrocities
against the Syrian people. They’re also funding and directing
Hezbollah and their operations inside Syria. 67 They’re heavily engaged
in Yemen, providing assistance and weapons to the Houthis. 68 They’re
providing ballistic missiles to the Houthis in Yemen that can reach
Riyadh—and have reached Riyadh—the capital of Saudi Arabia.69
They still maintain a vast terrorist network throughout the Middle
East and North Africa. 70 They basically are a highly destabilizing
actor in the region.
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, well, the Iranians do sound, from that
description, like the bad boys of the Middle East. We, until recently,
had an Iranian nuclear accord, which the United Nations and the
inspectors said was actually working. 71 Milena, why did the United
States pull out of that?
MILENA STERIO: The Iranian nuclear accord, which was signed back
in 2015, provided essentially that Iran was temporally halted in its
production of enriched uranium for military purposes. The accord was
going to be valid for 15 years. In exchange for that, there was an
easing and lifting of U.N. sanctions against Iran. 72 So, Iran had,
definitely, a financial incentive to stay in the agreement. President
Trump, back when he was candidate Trump, pretty often talked
about the Iran agreement as a bad deal that he wanted to pull out of.
And now he has announced that the U.S. is indeed pulling out.73
There doesn’t seem to be a Plan B, so it’s unclear what happens now
in terms of U.S. policies vis-à-vis Iran. In terms of explaining why he
pulled out of the agreement, some commenters think it was all about
undermining President Obama’s legacy. If you view the Iran
agreement as one of the high points of the Obama presidency, it has
to do with undermining that. 74 Also, it has to do with turning more
strategically towards our allies such as Israel, and perhaps Saudi
Arabia, 75 and the influence of some more hawkish advisors in the
Trump Administration, such as, for example: Mike Pompeo, who is
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now Secretary of State, and John Bolton, who is now the National
Security Advisor. 76
MICHAEL SCHARF: You said there didn’t seem to be a Plan B, but
prior to being appointed to the position of National Security Advisor,
John Bolton did publicly advocate Israeli airstrikes against Iran’s
nuclear facilities. 77 Ambassador Todd Buchwald: what would be the
pros and cons of either U.S. or Israeli airstrikes against those nuclear
facilities?
TODD BUCHWALD: Well, there are actual examples of the Israelis
attacking nuclear reactors in Iraq in 1981, a reactor called Osirak.78
At that time, the United States actually condemned the Israelis, with
President Reagan mitigating a little bit by saying the Israelis believed
what they were doing was right. However, there was a clear
condemnation. 79 There was another attack by the Israelis in 2007—
same idea, though it wasn’t acknowledged until much later. 80 It’s a
hard situation. I think that legal concepts will only dictate to a
certain degree, and not that great of a degree, what countries
decisions will be in using force in situations where they feel themselves
under existential threat. But, as a practical matter, if you’re thinking
about something like this, you’d have to think through the situation.
Can the reactors be destroyed? What are the benefits? What are the
costs? How are you going to mitigate the costs? And—very
importantly—how is the world is going to react even if you can pull it
off. And where you will end up on the rogueness scale? I think it’s a
lot easier to say—when you’re out of government—that this is a good
76.
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idea, than to be in government and do it. I suspect that this is not
really in the cards for the foreseeable future.
MICHAEL SCHARF: I hope you’re right about that. Paul Williams:
Let’s go to a slightly different part of the globe. You’ve been involved
in peace negotiations in both Yemen and the Sudan. Can you bring us
up to date on what the situation is in those countries and what policy
options you would recommend for the United States with regard to
them?
PAUL WILLIAMS: As Todd pointed out, now that we’re all out of
government, we have lots of leeway to recommend policy options. So,
I’ve got a few there. Both Yemen and Sudan have become neverending wars. In Yemen, in particular, you’ve got a three- or four-way
conflict by the parties in Yemen. But it’s been a spill-in conflict with
the Iranians and the Saudis heavily engaged in supporting the parties,
and the Americans, the British, and the French providing a lot of
weapons to our allies: the Saudis, the UAE, and others that are
engaged. 81 There are two problems with Yemen. One, there’s no
momentum for a peace process. Two, our allies—the Saudis—have
incredibly bad aim, and thousands of civilians have been killed by
American-made weapons. 82 It’s time to bring an end to the conflict in
Yemen. The Americans have a lot of leverage that they can put on
the Saudis and the others to be serious about engaging the peace
process. And, with the continued sanctions on Iran, there’s also
international leverage to get the Iranians to be serious. But, it’s going
to have to be the Americans, and their allies, which pressure our allies
to come to the table and negotiate a peace. In Sudan, we’ve got
nearly 30 years of conflict—this is the Darfur genocide, and it
continues. 83 There’s also expanded conflict in Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile. 84 This is a case where we actually have a tribunal that’s
engaged. The International Criminal Court has indicted the president
of Sudan for crimes against humanity, and yet he wanders the globe
unencumbered. 85 We need to be serious about putting pressure on
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countries like South Africa—and other countries which host president
Bashir in the face of the International Criminal Court’s arrest
warrant—and threaten sanctions if they do not send Omar Bashir to
the ICC to stand trial for crimes against humanity and genocide.
Until we are serious about ending these conflicts, and until we use the
leverage that we have, we are going to see these wars continue
without end and continued genocide, crimes against humanity, and
civilian casualties.
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let me bring Jim in on that question. So, Jim
Johnson: You have prosecuted a head of State, Charles Taylor, of
Liberia, at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. As Paul mentioned, al
Bashir, the president of the Sudan, has been indicted for genocide,
and he just pops over to neighboring countries. He’s even gone as far
as China. 86 They allow him to come in as an honored guest. The
International Criminal Court screams and yells, “he’s under
indictment, you have to arrest him, you have to send him to us,” and
nothing happens. The International Criminal Court, takes the case to
the Security Council and says, “you’re the Security Council, you sent
this case to us, do something!” And they don’t do anything. 87 What
does this tell us about the state of international criminal justice?
JAMES JOHNSON: Well, Michael, it doesn’t necessarily tell us anything
good. States have always and will continue to act in what they see is
their best interest. One of the largest impediments that the modern
international tribunals have had from the start—when you look at the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Rwandan Tribunal, our tribunal, and now
the ICC—is getting States to live up to their obligations to these
tribunals. It took us three years to bring Charles Taylor into our
custody after we indicted him. 88
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, fortunately international criminal law is
patient and persistent. We’re out of time. Todd Buchwald, Jim
Johnson, Paul Williams, and Milena Sterio – thank you for your
insights! This is Michael Scharf and you’ve been listening to Talking
Foreign Policy.
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